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ABSTRACT"; The thesis of the paper is that African smallholders, 
while numerically dominant in the agricultural systems 
' of• the. continent, have been largely .ignored in the
evolution "of agricultural .policy. With respect to ' the
■* .* * 
provision of delivery systems, governments have typically '
favoured the establishment of parastatal boards. The '
evidehce suggests1 that these boards have performed
-. ' 1 poorly.’ Case studies of parastatals in Zimbabwe are
•used to, illustrate how, in terms of’ delivery systems,
. it is nece.ssary to mobilise both producer initiative'
11-' 'I ' '■. ■/ : : - ■ • ■ ,-'Jand government resource's in order to devise, systems 
-..that.’ effectively and■ efficiently. serve the:'smallholder - 
■■ producer.- The argument is developed: that/the effective­
ness- of agricultural delivery systems can be substanti- 
• 'ally improved by'changing.the role of the state in their '
S' • < ' * v . /
operation from that of manager to that of referee.
Introduction *.■ '
The thesis -of this paper is that' delivery systems/for agricul-^ 
. t.ural producers in Africa have been developed mainly to.serve large- 
scale agriculture. The specific needs of- smallholder.producers, 
who are. numerically dominant in the region, have not been adequately 
. 'considered and, it is -this disregard. for the.significance of small-. . 
holder, producer that underlies■the decline, of agriculture in the 
region. Using Zimbabwe as a case study, examples,,of government 
intervention in’agricultural delivery systems' are discussed with 
particular reference 'to'adopting this intervention more effectively 
■ to serve Zimbabwean smallholders. ' The -general principle- which is ' i 
' suggested is that the complexity of administering smallholder
;
- - 2- -
'agricultural delivery systems is beyond the technical- and manpower • 
cape-city. of African, governments ^ The . Zimbabwe, case studies will-be 
used to' illustrate-, that by acting as the regulator, rather than the 
manager, of smallholder agricultural delivery systems, the state .can'
-, sign'if icantly .improve' the effectiveness of these' systems as a tool 
for .-rural development... ... .
.The1 Nature of Existing Agricultural Delivery Systems in Eastern
and ' Southern Africa ' .' "
— :-- '■/ ' ' -■ \
. The desigh of effective .delivery systems' for ' smallholders- is
' - I ' v./ . '
complex. The'environment; in-which the. systems, must operate consists -t 
of dispersed production .units ,-with low levels .of,, money income, ■ ’> 
savings.'and capital*. Both purchases of inputs and-, sales of ' outputs 
.will be small-and highly variable between'seasons. The biological 
; and .seasonal nature of agricultural-'production, combined with poor-, 
-communications and: limited infrastructure'adds further complexity.'
_ As illustrations', while the development of the;National ; ’•
.' Agricultural Marketing-Board and co-operative marketing, union depots 
■ in Zambia has. b'feen-impressive., 'inputs ;still,- consistently--arrive late , 
or not. at' all'. In consequence, their-value to ' the'-farmer, is severely 
•reduced'. -..This problem,is further compounded by./the' uncertainty,, and 
■. the .waste..of scarce- labour time, invol-yed in fruitless visit's -to* the 
■'depot (Elliot"). In Tanzania, the"well-managed Tanzania:-Rural 
■Development Bank (TRDB). provides credit for--fertilizer but .does not ' 
manage.,the. physical •distribution of the commodity. v Late delivery of'.
. .  i ■ . . .  I * t - , * /' . 1
. -fertilizer,-and-excessive lags .between payment and. delivery'-have 
depressed demand for fertilizer, -^particularly in the. more remote and, 
needy areas.,: Hence', .th.e TRDB' operates below optimum efficiency and.
• h
3 -
the crop yield increases are disappointingly below forecast, levels.
The effectiveness of' agricultural delivery systems and the 
overall performance of the smallholder sector are closely'related. 
Credit, delivered in the absence -of complementary research and 
extension packages, typically.results' in a high default rate and a • < 
consequent sharp increase in the cost of operating -the credit 
service.' Where, .crops' are- marketed through parastatals ■ facing .cash 
flow problems, slow, payment both to the. farmer ’ and the ..credit agency 
depresses the value of the crop to the farmer and increases' the cost (j
of both credit a'nd marketing services. -Farmers, .in response,, will
, , - . . . •' - ■-start to-use- inputs supplied- on credit -on crops marketed through
informal channels, increasing the problems of -both the crop parastatal .
and the credit agency., .Ellis ha-s- documented the decline in-cashewnut --
production' in Tanzania as the.-consequence .of confidence in'the payment
and grqding_ system, . • •
From the-macro-perspective major constraints on-the development
Or improvement of agricultural delivery systems in Africa are foreign'-
exchahge- (which-^ particularly 'affects -the availability . of key t re source s(U
such as fuel, transport, and agricultural chemicals), trained manpower,'-;
.1
revenue for recurrent as well as capital 'cost's and appropriate develop-
1 - - -■ _ ■ - -, > -
-ment-orientated research. Unless national governments design systems- 
which make-efficient use of foreign'and local currency-and of skilled 
manpower, the evidence suggests -that’ the formal delivery systems • •
rapidly ,.bec,ome wasteful, - exploitative and, in . consequence', depress, 
rather than-stimulate agricultural production., . ' -
- Typically,-agricultural.-research and training services are - —
starved , of funds.-whi-le marketing and credit services 'aife high-cost ,
' ' / 
**■■ * ■ • • f  4 | .( . •>
inefficient-and fail'to’reach-the weakest and neediest groups in the
• . . ■ -■ ' -  . ■, v. - . ' - -• j
countryside'. -
, For example,.. the major-element of public expenditure on Zambian'' 
■agriculture is grants and- subsidies to parastatals ,'-ranging from one"'.
.- half to four-fifths, of the. total. There is'als'o an .additional element 
o f ,subsidy to these bodies direct'from the Ministry’of Finance, adding
• further to- the financial drain'caused- by these bodies (IFAD).’ Ninety- 
- per cent of 'capital expenditure in'agriculture- in Tanzania-over the ■' . ' ‘ _ ' ■ J . ■
.- period . 197,5/76 , to j 9© 1 /82 -was - allocated to crop parastatals,,, Over 
■.the same period,-' research received '2 per,cent. ’ .
The- bentralis-ed nature of the typical.parastatal- delivery system 
) requires a high'degree of skill, expedience and management.- All-'too 
^often, the demands" of the .parastatals.for -such inputs exceed the' - - 
available supply.-. This, problem is further, compounded, by-the fact that
I -  ^ / , .
'given the poor .internal communications and the .cost,.in both time and 
money of internal -'travel, management and' policy decisions;-regarding 
agricultural. parastatals'.are-taken remote from the field-. Centralised.
■ control of Agriculture is unlikely to succeed in, a situation where' .
. - trained and .experienced-manpoYier is scarce,. infrastructure is poorly 
. developed and climate is highly',variable both within arid -'between ■ 
years’. The scarcity-of.-manpower together, with the urbari'.bias of >.' 
African development strategies has resulted-. in Nthe; agricultural sector 
of many nations’.failing', t'o -receive appropriate and (requisite resources' 
As, ..a typical" example, in.-Tanzan-ia the industrial sector contributes -10 
per c'ent' to., gross domestic product as opposed to agriculture !.-s 45 per 
-cent but the'industrial secto/T had , in. 1980? 159 .account a!nts -'as ,' 
compared with agriculture' s;. 45 (United' Republic" of Tanzania , .1 980)'.
" - •" , • 4 - : ' - .
/b
5The analysis of existing systems suggests their costs are 
excessive relative t'o the development benefits accruing .from their, 
operations. The evolution of informal systems to overcome the 
deficiencies'inherent in official systems has been widespread over, . 
the region,- indicating 'a clear desire by the smallholder producer 
for more effective delivery- services. Smuggling and unofficial 
marketing of agricultural commodities are regularly reported as 
significant’economic activities throughout Africa (see,-for example, 
.The. Economist. 1980, 1981, 1982a,. 1982b' 'and Eicher and Baker pp 53-5.7
for a review of the development of unofficial marketing in Africa). 
From Zambia, Elliot report's increasing evidence of the growth in 
informal ■'markets. While traditional crops and vegetables have always 
been sold in village markets, there has developed over ;the past 10 
years a lively unofficial market in products in whp-ch ■fche National 
Agricultural Marketing Bohrd has a.monopoly0 Similarly, the 
Tanzania - government reports s
"In principle, Government, through the National Milling, ' .
Company, has a monopoly in trade in the main cereals . ....
In-practice, a ■considerable trade takes place outside .
1 official channels in local markets and on an inter-district 
and inter-regional basis at. unofficial prices which have 
diverged substantially from official prices" (United 
Republic of Tanzania, (1982.) para 3.01 ) . / , ■
r '
It is.both surprising and encouraging to observe that, ■ a11ter 
decades of official discouragement, that African smallholders 
actively’se.ek to develop and use informal delivery systems where 
-■ official formal systems ..fail to serve the .needs of - the rural 
communities. ■ * 1 - - ■ ... - ' . ■-.
/6
. 1 - 6
. - Underlying'the .problems faced by off i.cidl' agricultural delivery 
systems in Eastern and Southerh Africa'is ■ the. fact that .these; • *■ .
systems remain' primarily orientated to -the-n,eeds of the large-scale 
producer-.- ■ 'Regardless of the conceptual' soundness and egalitarian, 
basis for development, strategies,'effective implementation.requires.
.-- the .sensitive’and efi'icleni co-ordination of macro-planning with -the.
\ micron-decisions of. individuals 'within *the .economy, ‘.Centralised para- 
statal. organisations are -the institutional form commonly used -by 
. African’governments to provide this linkage. .These bodies have been- 
'.the recipients of high .levels of both local and dohor'-funds, yet have 
"■widely failed; to operate effectively in the field (Elliot;1 .World 
, ’ JBank")... Succeeding sections will argue that. the design-.of such systems' 
is‘ inappropriate to the needs’ of a s'ign-ifleant and., neglected- client' 
group; 'the African smallholder. If it. is in. increased .smallholder ■’ ... 
product ion-"that, the’ answer to Africa's agricultural problems' lies,.-
y - ' . • ; / -- ■ , ' ' ' - - ’ N - - ' . ■ . . . .■ then'fundamental to the solution is.'a shift in the. perspective of - .^
" ' planners-, from dominating- to guiding'smallholders . ' (The reader, is - 
- . -referred to -Eicher. and ’-'Baker; ' Pei and' Rannis ; Prank; G’hai and .
Radwan;' Low;-. Murray; ■ Putterpiah; Thomas*; and’ World Bank,- for •
. . detailed discussion on.the ’significance.of smallholder.agriculture.in 
■ .agrarian deyeiopme’ht in .Africa ...independent'African'nations have a,
’. surprising tendency;-to (fallow-the' example of their-colonial -p.redecess.ors. 
in-.u,sing-regulations .to; administer, smallholder agricultural production. 
The reaction of. the' smallholders', is c-onsist'ently .’.to. circumvent or,' -at 
..yorstresist such authority' (see,, for-example, C'allear; Couls'on; ■ -■ ,
'.. Ellis ;'., 'and Hyden1)-.' In the ’following 'sections , the design "of :
appropriate’, deli.v.ery. systems for smallholders is discussed' in more '- '. 
.detail based primarily oh data. and experience from'"Zimbabwe’. •.'
« • • •
:- In reviewing agricultural marketing policy for. Zimbabwe, .the.
. 1 . . , • A.
Chavunduka Commission noted the poor performance of parastatal 
marketing bodies elsewhere in Africa. However, i-t went on'to •
\observe 2 . - ' . . ;
' I •f , j
"Zimbabwe's marketing boards have not grown from the same . ' 
roots as similar-organisations, in most other parts of Africa.
■ In Zimbabwe j .the need f.or controlled-marketing was'recognised 
by, producers.- Producers have considerable influence, on both 
the policy and the' general management of the boards'. This '*
-. contrasts withthe situation in. many other territories-where - - 
marketing boards were, set up On the initiative of the state 
and • where producer- representation tends to be. weak or ”
ine-ffectiv.e . The Commission ■ fel-t that the efficiency Of < 
operation of the parastatal marketing boards^ in' Zimbabwe ' :
' derived to a considerable extent fromi the strength of 
produced representation" ('Chavunduka, p. 102. (emphasis, added))..'
Agricultural Delivery Systems in Zimbabwe '
' In terms of their use. Of producer representation, .Zimbabwe's-"para--.' 
/statals provide a useful) model. Howeverparastatal development in 
Zimbabwe has 'also.largely revolved around the needs Of large-scale 
farmers. With independence',, these: organisation^ face-the .need to 
service small-scale agriculture to a greater extent than'in' the past. 
Zimbabwe, is, without- que.stion, substantially, better endowed "with 
trained manpower at independence than its northern neighbours, but 
in setting.-national policy, it faces a- constraint typical of the 
region., 4 There is' dearth of experienced and.senior officials
.familiar with a dyna,mic and .productive ^ smallholder agriculture.- 
-.The .experienced, educated, and-productive farmer, who played a major. ;■ 
role in, the development' of -policy for the la'rge-scale .sector, does 
not have a-counterpart in the smallholder)subsector.. The direct .
. -)
o • « «. . ./8
link-between'the. farmer and national government-has-been central,'.
. ‘ ' • ' \
.not only to the'.development of large-scale agriculture in Zimbabwe,
'■■but also to'the evolution of highly productive agricultural sectors
> in'such recently- settled • nations as Australia,' New Zealand and t h e / ”
United States.1 There exists in Zimbabwe no smallholder- agricultural
pressure group such as the'agricultural, lobby in the U.S. or the' ;
' EECi This is- not’ to denigrate the’ activities of '/existing small-. • , ’ ) : '
'holder organisations Such as .the .National Farmers' Association of 
Zimbabwe- (EFAZ)-. It is, .however, a reality, that typically these 
organisations, lack the income to employ their own policy advisors 
and thus operate at'"a .severe disadvantage ,.-'in situations such as 
• price negotiations',1, relative to. government ministries, parast.atals 
and "large-scale farmer o r g a n i s a t i o n s , ' . •
s * . _ / ■ t\ • .
Non-food Crop M a r k e t i n g T h e  Zimbabwe' Cotton Marketing -Board’: The -
-Cotton Marketing-Board (CMB) in Zimbabwe provides a..specific model 
of co-operation, between st.ate' and-private enterprises in agricultural
‘ . • ‘ ‘ ' i ' s' \
-marketing where the . state allo\vs the private' sector to operate muoh. 
of t!ha marketing chain ."under carefully'devised and. monitored .rules . 
Cotton product ion'has increased dramatically since 1965- and .cotton:, ■ ' - ' -  ^ 5 .' , ' ; 4 . •'.••••, ,1 ' •. 1 ‘ < - fis ^ow .Zimbabwe;1 s second largest Export crop*. ■. By,, 19.80, cotton
- . . \ - " • . . - 
production accounted' for 10 per cent of- commercial .agricultural
output (see Tables 1 and’.2).. Associated .with the growth in overall
cotton production has .been - a continuing rise .in smallholder .cotton
/ { ■ \ . - , . • .y. - ' ‘ - *
production,. .The value -of cotton' as' a smailholder; ca'sh cr.op.had1 been 
appreciated by policy-makers’ and active' efforts were, made', to 
encourage-its production in the smallholder sector. 1 The outcome . 
has..been a-n exceptional response by smallholders.- For example., 
smallholder production more than doubled to 77 023 tonnes between . 
the years 198O ana 1«81c The estimate, for the'1983 season'suggests \
i
/
further increases from the smallholder sector (Agricultural 
Marketing Authority). Tq -a considerable extent, the remarkable • 
development of the'cotton-industry in Zimbabwe is the outcome of a 
.highly sophisticated and responsive marketing systeimunique amongst 
cotton producing nations. - .
• The CMB’s responsibilities and functions include : .
• . ’ ■ ' , , /
.(1)‘ .'the purchase and storage of all seed cotton grown in- Zimbabwe;
(2) processing or 'ginning' the co.tton and marketing, the-resulting
products of lint and- cottonseed; ■ . ■ . ■
. ,, " * • ’ <
(3 ) ensuring the adequate .suplply df certified planting seed.• for.
.all cotton growers 'in Zimbabwe.
In order to enable the CMB to carry out.these,'functions_
efficiently,^appropriate legislation has been- passed to control a*
variety of aspects of cotton production. , All cotton groweys must ' w; ^  
register with,the CMB and large producers must'adhere to.a delivery' 
quota.system'to ensure orderly throughput-, in, the ginneries.. Grading 
standards are classified and there is,a system established to 
obtain crop'and other information from both growers, and "the trade.
The-varieties of cotton that,may be grown are controlled ■ by the 
■Board'. Under the Seeds Act, ;*the Board is a-Certifying 'Agent for 
the seed .certification "scheme. . It- also -acts for the Zimbabwe 
Government in the' collection■of.statutory levies from-growers ’ 
(Cotton.Marketing Board, 1982a). ' n
, ' The CMB operates ginnery depots at Kadoma, Chegut-u, Banket, ■ 
Glendale, Shamva, Tafuna and Mutare 'which receive and process • , ,
cotton from growers.- A further private 'ginnery at /Triangle
: ' . ■ ' - I. . • . ' . - ' ■ . . ' ’ I''-/' 1
1 . ...... . / 1 0  - ■ ,- i V ,
operates • on. an agency basis for- the Board. .For growers in the 
remote areas- of the' country, there are a number .of transit depots 
where cotton -is ‘received 'and .gradedv . Cotton’ delivered to these 
depots is bulked- and later delivered to the, appropriate ginnery 
for processing. ■ • , ’
- ' \ ■ ' " - ' ■: By world standards,, Zimbabwe is a small- producer. - Although 
-world cotton production and- consumption grew steadily during the ' 
late sixties and early seventies,' the recess ion. since 1974' has 
depressed demand.'- Latest report-s indicate . that •: production -and-. 
consumption are Once more -in balance-but there'remains a, consider-'
■ able’stockpile of unsold' cotton, particularly in the United States/
which' can be expected’.to depress marked prices.-over the next-few 
years (Agricultural Marketing Authority). Zimbabwe, however.,/ 
consistently sells, all cotton produced-. - - . ' '
The CMB-’s -typical customer is producing -a -high quality',- fine,,- 
. strong yarn which' is usually 1.00 per cent cotton. This yarn -i's thei 
.- woven or knitted into high quality fabrics using,fully automated' 
-and capital intensive equipment' (Cotton Marketing Board., ' 1982b) .
■ Such customer's -require, and will pay for, lint of consistent and/' 
known"characteristicso 'The CMB Has located a specific market ’ .
'.segment for its product and does’ not compete against the enormous 
-production- of such-countries- as. the United States and the USSR..'
- The entire' production and marketing' system- - .grower / ^researcher,
' extension worker,' buyer and exporter r,- is designed so as to meet 
the requirements 'of , this specialist' market. • , ■' V  ■ •
"'The Board".operates -through a-' single broker, the privately* 
owned Zimbabwe Cotton. .Corporation (zCC) .' The-broker is.-an - .- 
. integral part' of the Zimbabwe cotton industry and, therefore, acts
-' -. ...... ./i i -;
.... ■ V .-x
■ .,■' ' .TABLE 1 ' .' . , . ' .
■VALUE OF COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT’ IN ZIMBABWE PY COMMODITY
'1975 1980
Commodity Z$(in)
; 4 -  : 5 ■
j L Z$(m) , 1°
Tobacco 7 . / 71.' ■ 57. • ■ , 5.9 ■
/
17 ■ . 99; 17 '/
Cotton ' ~ -1. . ' 1 * 52 .- . 9 7 * -56 ■ ' 10 ■
Sugar . ■ 12 . 10 ■ 55 16.- ■9'1 ‘15
Coffee • /• • o' •
1 ' 4 - • • 12 "
.... 2 ;
Maize - ■ 10 '✓ ■8 • -  59 17 ■' ■ ■ 82 14 7
Wheat « - « , • 0 ' 15 ' . 4 ' 21 -- ’ 4 '
Soyabeans;" 0 9 9 « . .5 ' 1 14 '7.2.
■Beef :
' ' * ' V " - 19 ; ' 1 5 • 60 ' '17. ' ' . 88 " _ . 1 6 '
Pigs V 3 •. . 2 5 .. 2 7 . . 1 .
Milk;. ' . : 5 - - ' ■ v4' ; ■ ; 1 4 . ' . 4 27. 5 '
Other ; ,' 5 , 3 ' 45. • :‘15 ■ ' ' 82 . ■( 14 . ■
/
1.9.4 - -1.00 ■ 5 4 9 ' 10 0 . 579 • 100
■ i- ■ ■ « . . ■
Insignificant (less-'.than O',-5 'per cent)'
Sources Central Statistical Office, Zimbabwe.
, ' . ■ . \  * /  ■ -
z/ l .00 is approximately US$1-.00 (December, 1985)
TABLE 2
■ZIMBABWE s. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS
1963 • 1 97:5 1980
Commodity '000t Z$(m) '000t Z$(m) 'OOOt ' Z$('m)
.• 'Tobacco 119 93 $56 65 93 11.8
Cotton - 33 ; 19 < 54 ' 57
Sugar3 27 T ■8 157 43 . 166 47
Coffee/Tea 1 * • « 8 7 ’ • ■ 9 : . 13
Maize. 8 1 842 47 63 7
Meat^ ■ 16 8 41 24 . ; 13 14
■< Hides 6 ■1 9 . 2 ' 1 3
Oilseed0 . - - ’ - 15 2 - 2 1
427
~
■ - 1 161 209 ,407 2 60
Rotes, s .... Less than $1m
>
(a) Sugars raws and refined'
(b) Fresh, frozen, chilled
(c) Cottonseed, soyabeans, groundnuts
Z$1.00 is' approximately US$1.00. (December, 1983)
/
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' -as a highly efficient-medium through; which.Zimbabwers -cotton can'be 
sold to Spinners producing high-quality, high value products. -The- 
CMB has evolved , in'co-operation with ZCC, a unique, quality control , 
system .to ensure that seed, cotton of consistent'.quality is-ginned.. - 
" at one time -to yield a lint of known -and uniform specification (for -
\ l ' " ’ ’ _ < . . ' - . r .
- a full description see Blackie,' forthcoming) . • ■ '
' .'-Today, cotton.is ihe biggest smallholder cash crop in Zimbabwe.' r 
It is'a.'high value crop -which' is suited, to. the remoter and mope '
■marginal.rainfall areas.of-the country. 'The numbers of registered ,
' ' smallholders have grown, from negligible proportions in. the early- ' 
1960''S(tp nearly ' 80• 000 . in' 1 983'«. Smallholder production now accounts 
for well over a third of. the -total crop;1 • Current, estimate's suggest 
that-a typical smallholder can earn,a profit of 'Z$2Q0 per heetare . .
< from' cotton production.and,many smallholders plant two or more; " '
hectares annually (Blackie, forthc-oming,) .' The-expansion'of the ' 
cotton industry and the development of the neglected smallholder 
' areas of Zimbabwe are integrally' linked. • ■ ■ . * . '.
. • . ' . The Cotton Marketing Board operations provide a valuable model
' • d . . \ . ' . . " J ■ ■
for state intervention in an agricultural marketing.system. .'Cotton - 
producers play-an active role in the development of the industry. ' 
- They are represented on the CMB and also contribute directly to the'
- cotton research and training programmes.' Uniquely they run their. : 
own training-centre to' serve the needs of both large, and small-scale. • - y ' * ' - • ’ ‘ .■ ’ . \ - • • , '- • , \ . • ' . ; v . . , ; ’ . 1■farmers-. .The'CMB defines ;its 'role as, ensuring :the efficient flow' of 
harvested-cotton from-producer-to the,.spinning’mill. Given the; size 
of the^Zimbabwe crop by world standards .and the continuing stockpile 
.' of unsold cotton held by some of. the-.largest producers, it would.be 
impossible-, for Zimbabwe, to be other than a 1 price-taker1 in the.. . '
O .
\ f ;  j
V-.J'
* /  ^.4*
world market for average or. low quality lints. .The str.aiegy of', the, 
CMB, therefore, has teen to ensure that Zimbabwe can consistently ' 
meet the requirements of a'specialised segment, of the world market;'
^ ' ' -1 ' i . '
that requiring lints of known and,reliable characteristics for the: 
production of high-quality yarns' and which is prepared to pay 
premium prices 'to obtain such lints. ' The use of a single broker 
enables virtually a personalised .service,, to be provided .to spinners 
of such yarns./ The broker, the Zimbabwe’Cotton Corporation, knows 
both the Zimbabwe cotton industry and the/appropriate /buyers. of, lint, 
in the highly.competitive world market. The. grading and quality 
control . system-.is-designed’ both to encourage producers to adopt . ■. /, 
better, husbandry practices and to ensure that spinners ‘get 'exactly- 
the lint-they require./ . The/agronomic .research- programme and 
extension and training exercises are designed in close collaboration 
.with marketing staff. There is a.' rapid and. efficient’transfer of 
market information / from the consumer to- the field. /
'The state,/through the CMB, could.control all’Aspects of. the . 
cotton marketing ’system from field research; to extension and credit' -' 
to farmers, to,- eventual sale to the spinning mill. -Experience,, ■ as 
reviewed, in-ithis paper,.- suggests the limitations • of this route. . The 
CMB approach'has'' been tp.contrc/l .the key. points' in the marketing, 
system and to co-ord ina’tp’ the activities of the other agencies' 
involved in-the production’ and disposal’ of cotton. The.--CMB,. through 
.its monopoly as certified; cottonseed purchaser and distributor, 
controls the varietiesv of cotton • grown .in Zimbabwe' but relies on . . 
-private gr qvi.ers - to- produce certified seed under close 'supervision > ’ 
from the’ Board.’ As the’ sole buyer-.of cotton, the CMB ensures that . ,
all cotton lint, offered...for -sale, from Zimbabwe has 'bien purchased 
and processed according -to- known and ; laid-<| own standai’d.s. - - .
\. , -Agronomic research is undertaken-"by the Ministry of Agriculture 
’’ under - guidance from the Board / the growers and. the- Zimbabwe -Cotton'
. Corporation. -The Board' is actively involved in this- research.
. programme but 5oe's not control it Similarly,.. extension-and , credit' 
■programmes are not operated' "by .the Boigrdi although* through its 
involvement in the cotton industry* the Board’s' advice and assistance 
in the design of those .programmes is/ sought.by the agencies involved..
. The one exception is extension exercises explaining the work of the 
'Bo.ard, particularly the 'grading and quality control' systems * to i 
- ■ farmers and others associated with the.'cotton industry. 1
. * ■' '- 
' Finally*’ the implementation. of -the grading and . quality cohtrbl-
system'and the' selling cjf cotton, lint to overseas buyers is. ■ 
/contracted to private industry. The' Board' retains control over 
■' these ,'activities as the Zimbabwe. Cotton Corporation acts only as the 
Board r.s agent, not as principal, - in ‘these .activities... .The selling 
of cotton, in the market ’segment within which Zimbabwe .'operates-, 'is ; 
■ ' highly competitive. The considered use of a private firm to act;.-as 
broker .enables the-Bbard to-tap the flexibility of private enter­
prise'within the policy environment' of- a state cprporation. Under 
current arrangements, the ZCC. has a ’clear incentive to maintain the 
integrity and 'efficiency of the grading and quality control system..' 
Thepnore reliable the system, the more straightforward - becomes the' ■ 
activity of'selling the lint.’ If-grading ' and - quality control became 
.the responsibility of' a third party., such as the- CMB., the’ direct link' 
between the activities of quality control-and selling would be lost.
- The outcome would almost.certainly be that Zimbabwe'would lose its 
competitive edge .in the' high-quality, ..high-value yarn .market and., 
.would need, to dispose of .its.- cotton in the lower-value and over­
crowded marke.t/for average to lo'w quality grades-. .The farmer, ’and 
the hatipn, would be poorer in consequence.
".I-.-. . 1
The' GMB experience indicates that lit is. both possible, and 
practical to use parastatal -marketing successfully to develop and ■*" 
extend. productive cash' cropping in a national context* It also 
suggests that such intervention-requires active producer involvement,, 
progressive and innovative research-programme -and a well■ defined1 
marketing strategy. Clearly, in dealing-with a non-food commodity 
which is almost impossible-to market'other than'through official 
channels, the'CMB's task of directing the industry more straight­
forward than is the case with marketing agencies handling locally-r-- - " c ' • ■ . . . .
traded food commodities.' Nevertheless, the successful blend.' of'
private .and-public sector respons ibilities in the'-production and / '■
marketing system for cotton will be used as a. principle underlying
suggestions below for'the development-of other .agricultural delivery
systems. , . . . -
Food'. Crop Marketing s Maize ■ Marketing i-n Eastern/Central - Africa. 
and Zimbabwe; -Maize in Zimbabwe is traded ;mainly\.by a single'- 
parastatal, 'the Grain Marketing Board (GMB),• ; It is'the sole, legal
' , ' ‘ ' "n.
trader in maize in most of the commercial farming areas (known as- ■
\ '■ ' ’ . ' ■ '' . ' : . -r' ' .Area; Ay . and -the residual purchaser in the remainder of. the country ' 
(Area. B) . In Area B, .which encompas-ses the communal farming-areas- 
free local trade in maize1 is permitted.* ■ .'
J . , - , f 1
The'GMB is responsible for handling, storage; and disposal of. 
maize and for the.imanagement of imports and exports -of maize (the
* Agricultural land, in Zimbabwe is divided into two mail! classes
1) g Commercial, farming Areas
2 ) ■ Communal Farming .Areas;
million hectares . occupied 
mainly by' white,' large-scale 
farmers- on .a predominantly free-' 
hold .basis. - This, area is 
currently being partly ^ .resettled 
by smallholders under a national 
land'redistribution programme.
16 ,3 million hectares occupied' by * 
black,.smallholder producers under 
a variety.of traditional'tenure ' - 
arrangements.' ... :
Board, also- handles 'other commodities which will.’hot he considered 
in this paper,).  ^The- GMB dpks not process ‘ maize’ but sells it, at a. 
price 'controlled by'government,, -to private sector millers'.' ' To keep 
maize meal prices .low, these millers have been subsidised although’ i 
■the subsidy’.has recently been substantially reduced and the. ' 
Zimbabwe government’plans the., total elimination ’ of ‘this subsidy, in-, 
the future. : Farmers .deliver maiz-e, either’in .bulk or in'-bag’s , to
GMB receiving depot's where\a'national price is paid according to " 
grade, ’ Most-depots ’are along the line of -rail or on the'main tar 
roads but,-since independence,. a. number of depots have^ been 
’established in the communal' lands'.; - Communal land" farmers! "can des­
patch maize to thei'r nearest depot./and receive the standard national 
price for the grade delivered. Alternatively they. can’.sell It
. . i ■ ., ■ ■ , ' ' . ' ’. . .
■ through’a ’local' co-operative- or. an'.approv ed buyer' (normally-a1’ 
.rural tpader. licensed to purchase maize for the Board ). : In the ’ '. 
last, two instances-, the op-operative. Or -buyer charges' a -marketing 
fee for. transporting the maize to the GMB--. ■
■The- (MB maize procurement’strategy has twp important elements. 
.Firstly., .since . farmers, receive-a uniform price for-grain delivered 
to depots the expansion of' the' depot. network has/increased1-the '
number of maize producers receiving the prescribed'’ national-price.
Thus ’ Zimbabwe, is following the example - .of much-of the rest of . . .
Africa in adopting, a- policy of a uniform national producer-price . .
for maize, ', Secondly, there, is no seasonal elementin:maize pricing
- . / : ‘ _ - • ' ' ’ • * • •
' . . v. ’ . .. •
so that .there is little incentive' for 'either, producers or processors -• 
to-store maizeConsequently the ■ GMB heart most of the costs and 
risks associated ?;ith grain storage between harvests. . '
’ The. grain, procurement' policies of the GMB are typical of
'p'arastatal ’ food grain marketing agencies in-East* and Central Africa.
. . .. /10• t t
Most countries ih the- region fix both consumer and producer prices '
for major food grains.- To enforce such' controlled prices, official
marketing of. these commodities is-through <a. monopolistic and
monopsonistic-parastatal marketing board. " These ..commodities'-are
purchased, by the board, transported to. a. central depot from -where
they are d istributed s f or processing arid distribution. This concept
works well where, as in pre-independence Zimbabwe, the bulk of.
production.'is ip the hands of a ;few, geographically concentrated
large-scale producers' who grow food stap.les.-as cash crops, and
where the commodities concerned are mainly -.to be distributed amongst
urban consumers'..' There is a one-way. flow of , the commodity from the
countryside-to'.the ^ town. The marketing board c:an establish storage'
depots in the main producing 'areas -and \d:istribute'grains to urban
millers for processing as required.■ The limited.number of-producers
and' the large scale of their production'■precludes -significant
unofficial marketings where the board is. operated with. any> reasonable
degree of competence; Policing of-fixed' wholesale and. retail prices
■in the urban a.reas,- with their superior infrastructure and communic-
-ations network, i^ relatively’straightforward . Even s'o-,- experience!.
has shown that .estimates of future supply and. demand levels cannot 
_ . ... ..... ' .
be made with adequate'precision to enable a reasonably'precise' 
-pricing policy to be .adopted (Muir)« . \ r ' •
Once the smallholder 'becomes. involved in this market system-, - n 
there is a marked shift in. the.nufnber and type of variables■facing '■ 
marketing policy makers . .The nature .of. smallholder farming systems- 
is ‘that all households'will, attempt to meet their own'fhod needs as 
Aa''priority./ Therefore", marketed food grains will be ..usually those ■
• surplus to. household'requirements,■ Food grain 'yields in Africa-are 
highly .influenced by-.rainfall. and , given the variable rainfall 
patterns over the continent, - surplus grain productiokn from, small- • .
holders .will''fluctuate markedly from.year to year. : -'The..marketing 
board ./thus .faces .the problem .'of' collecting small .quantified, of ' l' _ • .a i ■ ( ' ■ . • i .
grain from large numbers; of dispersed producers-. Moreover,. ' ' 
■defending upon the- distribution, of rainfall /  the surplus . production <
’ • ’ ’ „ A / / . ,V. ,areas may well shift' from season to season. •' . ; - .
Uniform'pricing-is usually' justified on equity 'grounds^ ' ■ 
commonly it'is assumed.that paying-producers a'var.iable price for ’’ 
a uniform commodity is unfair. Yet • Jaiiseh .ha? demonstrated .that 
uniform pricing,is’ inefficient in both equity and efficiency terms. 
The effect is to increas^ marketing costs .substantially, to' widen 
nather thAif harrow. income differentials -between, farmers in rich and 
p'oor .areas ' a Ad t-o depress producer prices in the poorer, food- 
deficit regions.'/ The lack of a seasonal element in maize, pricing . 
•policy, puts a further .burden.''on the .marketing board 'since producers 
naturally will sell-tlieir grain as soon as possible, after harvest;
The demand, for transport, storage'ahd ,processing" is. thus ' 
concentrated-at,the. harvest season. This,decreases the-efficiency 
of utilisation'\of these scarce .resources • and increases marketing 
costs. ' . : - , ,. "" ' - . ,
•The infrastructural ..-burdeh and associated expense's of
operating a state grains marketing board' .often pushes'.the Cost of 
the grain well-above import parity levels. In. order to reduce' 
overhead costs per Unit ■of. grain, produced.,- smallholders- are
encouraged or co-erced into marketing their grains. For -example, 
villages in ■ Tanzania have- been- required' to sell up to- 50 tonnes 
to the appropriate -food crop authority so as to achieve targets. : 
-set. .b-jf central; planner?, (United Republic of Tanzania., 1982 • pp 6-7). 
But the smallholder is • left. vulnerable because, .he is forced to- sell 
to. the-.central-authority. . When local food, .deficits occur, . processed
.'./■2Q ■ '
/
\.'grains need to be transported back, by the same costly .route, to^  
the countryside. Wot surprisingly, the smallholder is inherently.' 
suspicious of such a system. .Amongst the, factors which-can 
interrupt the flow of the. commodity either way ar'e impassable 
.roads, national transportation breakdowns, corrtiption and war.
All. these occur with frightening frequency and' all involve 
influenced well■outside.local communities' control.' In consequence 
there is a .major unofficial trade'in food grains. Prices in this
i ■ '
market, which is largely,^but'not exclusively rural., are 
•■substantially higher than off ic:ial. prices . (Keeler e| al,); Lele 
and Chandler point out three critical outcomes'.from such a - , . 
marketing system '% ■ ' ' • • • ■ ■  \ 1
/. . ' ■ •
(l). There, is no way in-which production, consumption' or stocks.
r . ’ jsi can be estimated. At best, only the transactions of the 
■" official marketing agency.will be known.:
(2) Most food transactions take place.onthe unofficial market 
and .-.are thus beyond national control’.
(j) Producers can-market .through both official-and. unofficial. 
channels, -they can barter crops or consum<= them within'thd 
■ household.' Transfers between', these various' channels are 
frequent and. there is no necessary correlation, between . - .
.1 * './.■■ ■.' .
changes in the activity of the official marketing agency. '\. • . \ _ . - / : • ' ' ' -V *
and changes in production.-
The. state food'-.marketing board., therefore, is in the position 
of being inquired to market highly. variable 'levels of production of - 
a commodity which is( expensive 'to acquire and store. The nature 'of, 
the commodity-is such that storage - beyond . about two years''renders 
it unfit for human consumption; Exp.ort puts a heavy strain on.
/ 2 1
limited-'national transport' networks and,.in any'event, is , only .. 
viable, regionally. .• Ye.t even regional trade t in .food grains'is . - 
difficult.- Subsidised grains- from the (EEC and South Africa compete 
- effectively for regional food markets,"
^  - r.
.The approach adopted by the GMB' and. other- food procurement 
, * agencies works against•a decentralised rural development policy, -
Producer prices, are1 based on such criteria as< cost' of production .on . 
/i Treasury .revenues-. Maize yields, however,' .are highly sensitive to
• ' ■ ' . . .  x" ■ ' • **"■ . 1 7 j. . & '■ ‘ ! . ‘ , f•:weather. Since' the. demand for, maize is inelastica- pricing policy
in which seasonal factors were significant,; would allow for lower. ' ’
v \ . . ■ .yields due to a'poor growing season .to-be compensated for by higher- ■ 
, prices'. • Farm incomes, rather. than .prices would then .be stabilised .
' . ' ‘ • • ' . i * 1 ' ^
r State grain marketing-boards-'typically,fail' to' ca-ter ..adequately ■
■ • • . . . . ' , v
-' or major regional, food, shortage's. Heyer observed' this, in"Kenya ’ and . 
the 1982/83. drought .'in- Zimbab'we saw,-the - GMB facing severe problems 
. • ; in moving-maize to .deficit areas 'in spite of’an overall-national 
■ .surplus of maize. ■ The' GMB -system^' like, many other. similar .systems 
'.in Aflic.a,. was designed .with the implicit assumption that rural food ,“ ' • •i‘
- supplies will. be .provided'-for'by' local production.' Good rains' and -■ 
yields over the last few years, have'tended' to mask, the distributional- 
. inefficiencies of;.the marketing system. • In .a good .year,', the, coiimunal 
areas are largely•self-sufficient and the absence of an efficient, 
food supply'system is not a .major problem, • In'drought ;.years.'-it! is -.
. '■ disastrous'-., - At current distribution margins,'it i,s sub-ecohoimic for 
. :• retailers in the remoter, areas of ' the .country' to. • stock maize-meal. ■ 
(Some, however, • continue' to do so in limited amounts, as, a 'lods- 
. leader'o-)1 Therefore these areas have no alternate source of-.supply 
y ..when-looal food production fails. This 'Situation .may be'aggravated. 
.'.by. the incentive to se.ll.mai'ze -to the .GMB 5 ' some1 commentators .
9 ' • 9 A .,/2.2
suggest producers ' may have retained .-less maize grain, than normal' - 
■with the intention of'.purchasing subsidised maize meal. ' Before the- 
197-9/80 season, less , than ib'per cent of smallholder maize' was/ .sold
to'the GMB, whereas in 198J ov.er a-third of smallholder, production'■ ' - _ i' . -
■ was marketed through .this route. _ • .■ • i • . . / -
' ‘ - ■ f . - .■ ; ■'  ^ ‘ . .
In the less remote areas', subsidised1 maize meal produced by the 
■■ -. large urban millers puts local small mills but of-business. Stanning 
estimated that 200 local mills had closed since independence since- 
• - they were unable'with urban millers receiving a subsidy of', nearly .- 
, Z^100 per tonne. The multiplier effects from- trade and . processing- 
grain ‘thus almci^t entirely accrue to capital-intensive urban . - ,
industry at -the expense of decentralised development.. Early 1983 
saw Zimbabwe unable-to meet the, local demand for maizeymeal due to 
capacity problems' in.the urban, mills (Jansen, 1982). Meantime, 
adequate.stocks .of maize were available nationally and small -mills( 
were closing due to- lack .of business. . * .-'
The marketing-system based on.state/private' sector co-operation 
' can do much ,to overcome the problems in food.grain marketing 
-identified -above. The GMB should define its lrole primarily-as a . * 
food procurement- agency for-the urban areas. Its infrastructure is 
.'already well developed - tor this purpose and it can extend into those' 
'communal farming areas where maize as a cash crop makes economic 
sense. These areas are 'either in .food surplus-or have•reasonable :. 
potential of. becoming so. The evidence already suggests thpt there
is a strong, response -to . the- provision of .depots in potentially
* ' * . fsurplus, areas whereas, even in good.- seasons, production from ■
. . .  - . ■> . . , ‘ .
■ 'deficit areas 'fails even t.o cover depot running costs -(Makoni).' -
The problem facing Zimbabwe'at present is not-the procurement 'of . .
• adequate .national’maize supplies.but improved1and’ cheaper distribn-
■ - tion to rural foe>d deficit areas. \ ' .- -
/23V..
\Recent studies suggest that rural traders, generally offer
’ ' / . j
respectably efficient and.reliable service (World-Bank,. ’ 1 981 a). 
.-Zimbabwe has- a-"well established network of rural stores,, grain 
. mills and bus service's.. The' 'expansion of this network is./essential
.'to the maintenance -of rural .food supplies. .'. Credit for groups, or
individuals to,s-et up grinding mills, bulk storage -facilities and,
-■ , to'purchase transport or to improve the road network is:, a possibil­
ity‘'which .will'be" enlarged ' on in the'following •section.■ This,
v • • . ’ . 1  --however., is not a -direct . function of the- GMB although -through its ;
■"active interest ih‘maize ■ production it could .play. .agcatalytic- role,
. ' ■ '' f • ' •- '
More .directly,, the'. GMB could significantly .improve the.'"distributioh
of -maize, together with aggregate consumer, and"producer 'welfare .by ;
.j relaxing* controls- on internal maize trading.. .Existing'consumer '
pricing policies benefit mainly the.-urban'consumer while1 .the
producer -pricing policy destabilises, firm incomes and. ac fcually.
' increases, the .income'gap between the rich, and .poor {Child., Jansen).
' :,The single channel marketing system concept, on which ;the GMB is
based', 'assumes rural self-sufficiency .in maize.- - The reality ■ is 'that 
.- -large > areas of the'.-dountry, • for a varie'ty of''reasons., are likely , •
>' to ‘ suffer-from food deficits in ,a below- average .season,.. ' A /single , . < 
- channel system is unable to serve, these areas .'exceptgat. a -very 
. high" cost! . Child'has undertaken a preliminary study. of decontrolled'.
- maize marketing .in --Zimbabwe which'indicates that 'there .are jna-jor .
gains to be, obtained, in terms :both. 'ofr equity and-of rural consumer 
..and producer welfare,.by liberalising the trade. in. maize. .His ..
,-proposed system., which is based -on experience in Kenya, India and- 
'• ' Pakistan, .has-.the defined objectives, of ensuring that: producers •
• have.-.access to-maize .-.markets and that' consumers -have food - supplies 
at the -least cost ..in' terlns of resource .allocation efficiency.
2-4
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The system,-'’as'.with the Cotton, Marketing Board., is based on
private/publ-ic sector' co-.ordination. The C-ITB would be. directly ,
involved in the following closely related activities. s,-
■ (1)-
. \ r-
. .1 -
Supply manipulation; The GMB wou.ld. maintain pre-iplanting, 
floor and ceiling.prices for maize. It would.buy mai^e 
, in surplus areas...when the price fell to the floor price 
and sell in-deficit ■ areas' when the price■exceeded the 
ceiling price*. .Thus the probability of extreme consumer 
and producer1'- price .fluctuations would be reduced,, while 
the■private sector would bear much, of,the financial ' 
burden of maize-procurement^and distribution.- This would 
release p.ubli)^  funds for other purposes, such as maintain-r- 
ing.a' .strategic' reserve 'or developing • infrastructure., If 
necessary, a-ptorage premium'could also be introduced as an 
incentive.for-farmers to hold gra'in'.. - - • ' '
- ;. (-2) Maintaining a strategic reserves. Since the storage-life
of maize is only two. years, a complete stock’turnover
) ' '
needs to be'made annually" (Lele and Chandler),- .This
.' -1 \ 
makes- the long-term storage of maize an ^ expensive ■'
. activity, unattractive to-the private ' sector. .Further*’ .-
'"the difficulties and .costs, involved in. importin.g maize' ■
at short notice to landlocked Zimbabwe mean that the
. /
Zimbabwe government would- be unlikely to^  relinquish 
'control of such'an important activity,, Consequently, the 
GJP'-'should' maintain -an adequate, strategic reserve to_ see. - 
■the nation through a poor cropping year.
* For a description .and analysis of the pride selling process, 
, ani the experience of such a system in Kenya, see Child.
/25
■\
\( 3 ) .  Control- of external, maize, trade; The GMB, in' the national
' interest,. wduld 'heed .to.control the external trade-in maize.7 - *- • ■ , t
-, It could, however, 'leave the actual trading to "brokers as is 
done by the CMB. ; ’ ■
(4')' Collect ion .of -information- on maize production, • distribution-.i
and- consumption; To. f a'c ilitate its ’ own -regulatory role,;-a,s’
. .- well ".as assisting, the ■' efficient t operation of the. maize
'k/
distribution 'system, 'the GMB: would, -require the establishment• • j „ . • ’ , . x • • . '
of a national information ' system ^ on .maize -production,'..pric es 
■' hnd supplies. . ■ 4\ ,
- This partially decontrolled system' would'eliminate much of the. , 
■expensive' '.rigidity inherent in the single' channel grain'board . it allows 
a legal free, market - to operate - between.'..nationally determined flobi and 
ceiling prices., Government' can use more, of its'scarce' resources for
development .purposes and" the,'bias -against ‘the- rural poor, is reduced, ‘The-
.private sector takes -over a significant- proportion of 'the trade in maize, 
As child shows, in this regard',- \the.".private sector- is < the multitude of
rural sijiall traders.,■ store-keepers, and -..transport operators rather than
' - • ' * ’ ■ ' 7. • ; ;/
urban.-.opera.tions', 'Consequently, the multiplier effect' from trade in maize'4
1 : ? ... , ^.is retained .in the countryside ra.th.er than the towns,* Government's 
activities are confined to.the management of an appropriate, strategic 
reserve and the determination o'f 'appropriate floor'arid ceiling price;s as 
well as- 'controlling foreign trade and' maintaining-'an efficient maize 
supply and demand ' inf ormatiOn .system.- Thus the burden of maintaining an 
eff icient maize .supply. and' 'distribution-system is1 more everily shared ' 
between '.the pp.bl.ic and .private sector's.. 1, 1 - >•
- ■ , .1,. - 
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Savings, mobilisation and rural credits ■ Agricultural credit in’
.., " ' ' - < - — ■_i— r i /
Zimbabwe is supplied by the pa'rastatal -Agricultural Finance’ Corpor­
ation (AFC), commercial.'and financ.e houses, banks-and ■, in the case
. . .  « ' ;
of o^ttle, the Cold Storage Commission, Prior to independence,- 
there were a number of .credit schemes"for smallholders'in Zimbabwe 
operated by private or charitable agencies . (see- Chavunduka for a 
review pf agricultural credit in Zimbabwe). The AFC played a yery- .
t ' - /
minor role in the suppljr of smallholder credit. Since-.-I 980, ’its
• ' • • < v
role in'.smallholder .lending‘has’ extended, considerably. with most 
loans being-for seasonal finance. (Current projections indicate 
that some 92 per, cent of’the value of lending to smallholders will
• ' . v ‘ ' / '
te -for seasonal requirements..) The AFC encourages • smallholders v;ho
require, loans to form themselves into, groups of between 20 and ' JO
members.- Each-loan group attends a pre-arranged meeting, with AFC'. '
, ' / ( ' • . 
field' staff where individual loa'n applications1 from the group'-
members-are. considered. -.The loans are supplied jmainly ' as seasonal
inputs which’’are ordered. and delivered by loca/l co-operative unions.
:The intention of the AFC is that groups' should develop -to\ a: stage
where 'a .single loan, application for the whole group'is submitted and
the group is jointly-and severally'liable■for-repayment.
/ - The AFC anticipates providing loans to some- 60-000-' smallholder
producers by 1985 at, a total- cost of about Z$17?1 million.. The- 
loans would be -for particular, input packages as recommended by AFC 
field staff. Ambitious- though this programme_is, it'reaches only a
v ^ ' . 1‘ " . iminority of the 800 00Q smallholders in Zimbabwe. . -The 'Zimbabwe' 
government1 s 'concern .for imp-roving the availability of credit to the 
smallholder ’ sector’,is well justified-? the'. prov-is ion of.credit is ' 
consistently 'identified as. an, important1 component’'of rural developer 
me,nt strategy'in, Africa. Y.et the "delivery of-, seasonal- credit; to
smallholders'is fraught with, difficulties. ' As noted earlier, even' the ; 
most efficient credit system will.falter in the absence of timely' ■
; ■ . ■. . .1
delivery, of appropriate 'inputs'.' African, credit institutions have •
'typically required a major input of subsidy from national.funds to remaih 
viable (Eicher and' Baker);.- Eicher and Baker■observe.that many' African 
' ' ■ smallholders treat pub-lip credit' As a. gift 5 .'consequently repayments are,
, Vat best, tardy.' Adams persuasively argues -that subsidised- credit 'destroys* 
‘‘th-e ‘incentives for communities'-to'‘mobilise their own' savings and is an 
• adequate substitute' for local' initiative. Credit institutions themselves 
. ■•/ have.-.the standard problems of communication and', management which .aff lict . ' 
African parast'atals (von. Pischke) .
Yet informal rural': financial markets are an established-part of, the 
agrarian economies of sub-Saha.ran Africa.... Rural "people d'o consistently ; 
require, and-- make use- of, - credit. .-.But their credit, requirements reflect 
the'priorities-'of Low' s' multi'-sectoral household-rather than the ' . 
commercial farm-'household , represented'.by. standard' farm management ' 
concept's .;. ' Credit is used only partially, for agricultural purposes, (see, - 
. '- for instance', Va'sthoff; Millerf .'Osuntogu$) .■ Probably. as ' a consequence, 1
- .both ■ publtq and private credit-has .generally-been.effectively channelled'
-to the riiorei,accessible...and larg'er-scale farmers- (Eicher' and Bakerj.'.' . . {
‘ ' ' .• • ‘ ■ ' x - ■' ’■ , , ' • > ’ '• '- Elliot) » That, it is'possible, to operate a.-credit system-on a, pro jec’t - 
,. scale has’ -been dem’onstr'ate.d in. a'number of studies' (‘see Eele;. King).
“What is more- elusive 'is the . successful -transfer ■ .of this- experience to a 
. national scale. ;
?' - Yet'-surveys of tlie .consumption patterns of ..the- African .rural '. :"
.'household suggest-that'savings are significant feature of household ■
economic, .behaviour. ‘In Zimbabwe-, Chi-me^za'ha's documented.'the; 
phenomenal growth of rural savings cl.ubs . since 1968 ... Erbrn a . small 
beginning in .1968, there. arey> in- 198-3, some .4 -000 Clubs registered'7with
' - ' ’ ' ■ ‘ ■ - / or
• -fc'he; umbrella Savings Development Movement (SDM)'. • The-SDMis a small
voluntary group which co-ordinates and assists savings clubs. movements'
throughout Zimbabwe... . The' clubs provide a mechanism whereby, rural ■ ■ '■ / •
people,, particularly women,, can save small amounts of ' jnpney- for some 
. future.purpose . - The-clubs also" provide . a forum whereby alternative', 
uses of savings can be discussed. The clubs'.often organise group., 
labour'for-club projects. Chimedsa'observes that'the clubs enable small 
producers organise'<the bulk purchasing of agricultural .inputs. The .club 
collects money, for input requirements and places a single, order resulting 
ih'cheaper and more timely delivery than'pccurs phrough other channels..
The evidence suggestS/\that significant local .sav-ings/.can be • ’■ ■
• mobilised through local1organisations.. These■groups have demonstrated ’ 
the capacity to .organise the. purchase and delivery, of inputs. Ah
- appropriate' .strategy for a. public agricultural credit .'institution, such- • 
as the AFC, could be to-.provide these -groups with the training and,, 
support necessary to manage larger sums. of money. ■ ■,'I.t could 'also match 
local savings t"o increase the. money supply in the countryside.' , While 
initially such matching sums might be grants, once the funds'-administered' 
by a- savings clu]e • exceeded a given limits further matching funds would 
be normal commercial loans .to' the club from, the -central credit 'agehcy. .
i . . . .  * • / "
'In-this m a n n e r t h e  ,savings ' clubs would-evolve-, with local control and , ' 
/initiative, into rural savings and loan societies. - This strategy -enables 
government, to allocate.credit, to'the smallholder sector without the .. ■ 't 
responsibility of operating directly.'the entire- credit1 system. Seasonal
creditwith' .its problems' of arranging timely deliveries arid recovery of-
revenues
spun-off
resources 
instance,
from, highly variable levels "of output marketing, is- largely - . 
to locally managed savings -^institutions . PubliG,- credit:
■ can then be- devoted more, to medi-pm and' long-term loans. For- 
Zimbabwe data suggest that seasonal- credit in thp-. absence, o.f -
J - - c y . , /-
\ ‘ ,
draught power may contribute little to productivity (Jackson.} Blackie 
and de Swardt)• .Public creSit could be usefully channelled into the . 
provision of draught animals ,and the/ required associated technology of - 
implements, dry-rsea.son . f eed ing facilities and handling yards.- Other
loans could be "for .capital development items such as. trucks, fencing.
A . . . ■, . • ‘
water' supplies and,- possibly, on. a group basis, 'local infrastructural 
development.' . Inevitably,, loans would be^  both larger, less- frequent and 
are c.onsequeritly more easily administered. . The use. of. 'sweat equity 
■(the -requirement, thgt applicants .provide a s.ubstantial:-input- of -labour 
to ' the. proposed pro ject) can "help" ensure -that credit is not regarded as 
a free .good by the community..
Ih this way,^government -makes use. of existing .-money supply; in the 
•countryside but' in a. manner which avoi'ds encouraging the'exploitation 
of the rural poor- by local,"moneylenders.' The people are left with a 
real choice as to the best use of; their savings.- .They are- not; forced 
into externally determined technological packages in order-to simplify
■ the administration of a. central1 credit system. Kather, .government^ now
■ can target, its rural lending-at medium and long-term development in the 
countryside. ‘ Lending is largely o.n a ' normal, commercial basis and. can 
favour those.activities, identified, by central planners'as priorities.;
Synthesis ; '
.African states hold the critical agricultural inputs of ..manpower-, 
.research,, finance and macro-economic 'policy.. ' They; also, through their 
role as procurement agencies for export commodities and "urban food., 
supplies , guide ‘ the . overall', direction of . the' agricultural sector, . With 
-these powers, national governments dominate the evolution Of the . 
agricultural sector. Reynolds-.writes (p* 1^) . - ■
, ./3Q.
' "The design of a system of institutions' must steer between the 
paternalistic approach which treats .rural people as, passive 
and fatalistic, necessitating state intervention to improve 'I ‘ . ■
■their-lot, and the-populist approach .which' simply asks that . .
'. politicians and .-bureaucrats, stop blocking local endeavours. _ -
The paternalistic model'is. fatally flawed ,. f or .it expects . /
passive recipients.of.its- attention to become initiators and 
responsible, citizens, The populist model ignores the Strength’ \ ;
of' entrenched local, Interests ,. which only, rules- and controls, 
from higher levels of administration can move. .. ■ '
■Agricultural production in Eastern and Southern. Africa. is risky, and 
difficult. -As the.quote above indicates, the design of institutions for . 
the .African environment .involves'. a ,rather more sensitive'approach to the  ^
development 'of ’ smallholder agriculture 'than has . been the case., in the . ' 
past.' 'The agricultural'models of both Western and 'Eastern ideologies ' -.
are inappropriate to .'Africa’s needs. ' The Western freehold concept ' ■ .
evolved.'in" combination with both-pxtra-territorial expansion and -national 
industrialisation* The Marxist collectivist- approach to agriculture is. , 
rooted in an - era, when’ large-scale, mechanised farming offered the 
Opportunity-for 'thinly populated agrarian economies to move to an :
industrialised base,:' In'. Africa today, extra-territorial expansion to ^ ^
absorbLthose displaced as. the-result of introducing economically.viable . ,
freehold properties’ is hot a realistic 'option. Industrial expansion^ in ■
the absence of agricultural-expansion, has proved unsustainable. The
large-scale agricultural enterprise in Africa has failed to develop much . 
beyond local enclaves, in consequence the emphasis .on large-scale . 
agriculture as’ah approach to- national development has been highly . . .
exploitative of the rural poor. . p . ■ •
Africa is, a diff icult agricultural environment. -lfri(ian governments
- 31' -
• fade a daunting array of rural ■ development problems« The,•exp-erieiice of • 
the past few dec.ad'es has conclusively shown that' constraints of majipower. 
finance and .environment are such as. to. prevent African governments. from 
effectively centrally planning and managing their economies. On the : 
other'hand the African smallholder' has demonstrated the• capacity to 
'respond positively to policies that augment his welfare and to undermined 
'those which' work against him., The effective participation Of the small-j 
holder in agricultural policy determination is central to agrarian 
transformation of; sub-Saharan Africa; ‘'The. thesis, of this paper is that 
.a responsive and productive agricultural sector, can be developed^ by 
using government to'regulate rather than manage the delivery .services■
. essential*.to agricultural. development. This, concept fits the natural 
■areas of specialisation, of-both the civil service and.. the private 
Rector;.- - i.i,.releasespublic funds .and manpower for infrastructural ;■ 
.development and; maintenance .rathei? than tying, thepe scarce .resources 
•to. costly .p’ublip ■corporations . That', such an approach .is both practical 
and effective has been demonstrated ■ by reference to^  Zimbabwe case \ ■ 
studies. ■'
• (
■ i
i -
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